Whitepaper Section: Governance Power Distribution Model for MingCoin

  1. Overview
  2.  To achieve a balance between community participation and sustainable development, we propose a multi-factor voting power system that ensures fair governance, discourages Sybil attacks, and empowers long-term contributors without enabling whale domination.
  3. Token Distribution Assumption
  • Total Token Supply: 1,000,000,000 tokens 
  • Community Size: 10,000 holders 
  • Developer Allocation: 20% (200,000,000 tokens), with mandatory 2-year lock 
  • Remaining 80% distributed among users, following U.S. wealth distribution model: 
    • Top 1%: 30% of tokens 
    • 1–10%: 35% 
    • 10–50%: 30% 
    • Bottom 50%: 5% 
  1. Voting Power Formula Each address’s total voting power is calculated as follows:
If tokens < 1000:     Voting Power = 0 Else:     Voting Power =         floor(log2(tokens / 1000)) * LockMultiplier       + BaseScore × 0.1       + ContribScore × 0.25       + SuperVote (if eligible, fixed at 100 votes)
  • BaseVotes: Activated after 1000 tokens. Logarithmic growth to prevent domination; capped at 15 votes. 
  • LockMultiplier: Scales voting power based on lock duration: 
Lock Duration LockMultiplier
No lock 1.0
1 month 1.2
3 months 1.5
6 months 1.8
12 months 2.0
24 months 2.5
48 months 3.0 (maximum)
  • ActivityScore Structure: 
    • BaseScore: Earned through lightweight participation (posting, voting, commenting); up to 10 points, 0.1 vote per point. 
    • ContribScore: Earned through high-impact actions (approved proposals, tutorials, onboarding); up to 15 points, 0.25 vote per point. 
    • Total maximum activity influence: 4.75 votes per address. 
  • SuperVote: Reserved for top token holders, granting +100 votes. SuperVotes are non-transferable and reviewed quarterly. 
  1. Anti-Sybil Design
  • No voting rights below 1000 tokens. 
  • Logarithmic growth and vote cap deter vote-splitting across wallets. 
  • SuperVote limited to one per entity via off-chain verification or snapshot behavior. 
  • Votes bound to locked addresses, reducing flash accumulation. 
  1. Governance Power Distribution (Simulated)
Group People Avg Tokens Lock x Base Score Contrib Score Avg Votes Vote Share
Top 1% 100 3M 3.0x 3 2 133.8 12.6%
1–10% 900 388,889 2.0x 5 4 17.5 14.8%
10–50% 4000 75,000 1.5x 7 6 11.2 42.2%
Bottom 50% 5000 10,000 1.0x 9 10 6.4 30.2%
Developer (Locked) 1 200M 3.0x 3 2 145.8 0.14%
  1. SuperVote Authority and Strategic Privileges To enhance strategic influence without centralizing control, SuperVote holders are granted:
  • Proposal Pre-screening Rights: Proposals may require a minimum of 5 SuperVotes to enter formal voting. 
  • Emergency Review Trigger: If one-third (rounded down) of SuperVote holders flag a proposal, it enters a mandatory second review stage. 
  • Delayed Approval Override: If two-thirds (rounded up) of SuperVote holders reject a proposal, it may be postponed or escalated. 
  • Visible Recognition: SuperVote addresses are publicly visible with a gold-tier badge, increasing transparency and accountability. 
SuperVote Allocation Formula: The total number of SuperVotes is calculated as: SuperVotes = min(floor(S / 10), BaseCap) Where S is the total token supply in millions, and BaseCap is defined as follows:
  • 20 if community size ≤ 1000 
  • 50 if community size ≤ 3000 
  • Unlimited (based on S) once the community exceeds 3000 holders 
This prevents early-stage over-distribution while enabling scalability as both token supply and community size grow. SuperVote Qualification and Freeze Mechanism To ensure voting integrity and prevent volatile governance swings, SuperVote eligibility is determined and frozen per governance cycle:
  • Evaluation Frequency: Every 30 days when the community has 1500 or fewer users; switches to every 60 days when the community exceeds 1500 users. 
  • New Entrant Cooldown: Addresses newly qualifying for SuperVote must maintain rank and locked status for 7 days (≤1500 users) or 10 days (>1500 users) before activation. 
  • Freeze Period: Once SuperVote seats are assigned, they remain fixed for the entire cycle until the next evaluation. 
  • Grace Period for Exit: If a holder drops out of the top SuperVote list, they retain their voting right until the current cycle concludes. 
  • Revocation Clause: Transferring or unlocking qualifying tokens during the freeze period results in immediate SuperVote loss for the cycle. 
  1. Developer Governance Veto Power To maintain stability during the early stage of the protocol, developers are granted limited veto power:
  • Year 1: Up to 4 proposal vetos 
  • Year 2: Up to 2 proposal vetos 
  • Year 3: Up to 1 proposal veto 
  • Year 4 and beyond: Developer veto power is permanently retired 
  • In addition, the developer wallet is permanently entitled to 1 SuperVote equivalent (100 votes) beyond any eligibility or ranking 
  1. Governance Principles
  • SuperVote holders carry unmatched individual influence but are strictly capped and decentralized. 
  • BaseVotes prevent whales from dominating through raw volume. 
  • Lock-in and activity models reward engaged, long-term participants. 
  • Developer power is economically significant but politically constrained. 
  1. Visual Hierarchy (optional for design)
  • Gold Tier: SuperVote holders (Top 100 whales) 
  • Silver Tier: Mid-level contributors with high lock-in/activity 
  • Bronze Tier: All active community members with 1000+ tokens 
  • Observer Tier: Wallets below threshold (no voting rights) 
  1. Conclusion This system creates a resilient and inclusive governance ecosystem that amplifies genuine participation while shielding against manipulation. It encourages token-holders to lock, contribute, and remain active, while establishing clear limits on elite influence and developer overreach.
  2. Proposal Lifecycle & Credit System To ensure that governance remains effective, scalable, and resistant to low-quality spam, we introduce a credit-based proposal system that rewards constructive participation while automatically filtering unqualified or low-effort initiatives.
Proposal Credit Balance
  • Each address begins with 1 Proposal Credit. 
  • Submitting a proposal costs 1 credit. 
  • Successfully passed proposals restore +1 credit (max balance = 3). 
  • Rejected or withdrawn proposals do not refund the credit. 
This creates a merit-based governance loop: consistent, quality contributors unlock more opportunity; low-quality spammers naturally time out. Proposal Warm-Up Filtering
  • All proposals enter a 48-hour pre-vote warm-up phase. 
  • During this phase, the community can signal interest via upvotes, comments, or direct SuperVote endorsements. 
  • Proposals must meet one of the following to move forward: 
    • Receive ≥ 3 SuperVote endorsements, or 
    • Receive ≥ 25 community upvotes (or equivalent participation metric) 
  • Proposals that fail to meet these criteria are automatically archived. 
Voting Queue and Load Control
  • A maximum of 5 proposals can enter the active voting phase per day. 
  • Proposals are selected in descending order of upvote count during warm-up. 
  • Overflow proposals are queued by interest score (upvotes + endorsements) and reviewed in order. 
Fast-Track Mechanisms
  • Major Proposals (with ≥10% of total SuperVotes) skip the warm-up phase and observe a 24-hour cooldown before voting. 
  • Emergency Proposals (with ≥15% of SuperVotes + 1 developer signature) skip both warm-up and cooldown and are flagged “critical” on-chain for immediate vote. 
Proposal Approval Thresholds & SuperVote Review:
  • Standard Proposals: Require ≥50% Yes votes, ≥10% total participation. If ≥33% SuperVotes vote No, the proposal is frozen and enters secondary review. 
  • Major Proposals: Require ≥75% Yes votes, ≥25% participation, and at least 33% SuperVote pre-approval before voting begins. 
  • Emergency Proposals: Require ≥50% Yes votes, ≥10% participation, and ≥15% SuperVotes plus one developer signature to activate. These may bypass cooldown under emergency flags. 
Rationale This system promotes governance quality without banning spontaneity. Contributors can always propose ideas, but only relevant, community-supported proposals will receive full attention. Strong proposers gain momentum and voice over time.